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GOOD LAW FOR “BAD HOMBRES” 
Matthew Neely* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article responds to President Trump’s proclamation that he may send, 
with Mexico’s consent, the U.S. military into Mexico to fight drug cartels. It 
particularly considers whether, during such an expedition, the U.S. military 
would be constrained by the law of armed conflict, human rights law, or 
neither. The Article concludes that the law of armed conflict would not apply 
but human rights law would. In support of this conclusion, the Article 
examines why the drug cartel violence in Mexico cannot legally be considered 
an armed conflict. The Article then explains why human rights law, on the 
other hand, would apply to any U.S. military action inside the territory of 
Mexico. In doing so, the Article discusses the U.S. government’s historical 
position that the United States has no extraterritorial human rights legal 
obligations. This Article argues to the contrary—that the United States does 
have extraterritorial human rights legal obligations within the specific scenario 
of a U.S. military expedition into Mexico because of both treaty and customary 
international law. This Article is important because it examines topical issues: 
the Mexican drug war, the possible involvement of the U.S. military, and the 
application of the law of war and human rights law to hybrid conflicts. 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States and Mexico share a border, are trading partners, and 
have a mutual interest in each other’s stability.1 It is not surprising, then, that 
the United States views the illicit Mexican drug trade, and its attendant 
violence, as an increasingly cancerous threat to U.S. security.2 Since 2006, the 
Mexican government has made defeating the drug cartels behind the illicit 
trade a priority. Still, their progress has been slow and President Trump said he 
 
 * Matthew Neely is an active duty United States Marine. The opinions expressed in this Article are 
solely the opinion of the author and do not portray or presume to portray any opinions of either the U.S. 
Department of Defense, U.S. Navy, or U.S. Marine Corps. I want to express my gratitude for my family’s 
support. I love you guys. 
 1 JUNE BEITTEL, CONG. RES. SERV., R41576, MEXICO: ORGANIZED CRIME AND DRUG TRAFFICKING 
ORGANIZATIONS, at 3 (2015). 
 2 See id. 
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might, with Mexico’s consent, deploy the U.S. military to help defeat these 
“bad hombres.”3  
As a candidate, President Trump criticized recent uses of the U.S. military 
as having been too “politically correct.”4 President Trump further claimed the 
targeting and killing of civilians is appropriate in some circumstances,5 but 
later clarified “the U.S. is bound by laws and treaties and [he] will not order 
our military or other officials to violate those laws . . . .”6 President Trump’s 
rhetoric makes ascertaining what law applies to a potential U.S. military 
engagement with Mexican drug cartels important for two reasons. First, the 
United States is founded on democratic principles and a respect for the law, 
and the United States’ failure to identify and follow applicable law would 
undermine its own legitimacy.7 Second, the United States’ security and 
prosperity hinges in part on a rules-based international order; therefore, the 
United States should use its power to underwrite that international order rather 
than erode its relevance.8 
Concerns over jus ad bellum international legal issues are immediately 
dispensed with because, under my proposed scenario, the U.S. military would 
enter Mexico with Mexico’s consent.9 Jus ad bellum is the body of 
international law that guides state behavior vis-à-vis the use of force.10 Jus ad 
bellum protects the principle of state sovereignty.11 When one state consents to 
another state’s use of force within its own territory, as is proposed in this 
Article, the issues of sovereignty and jus ad bellum become moot.12 What 
 
 3 Anna Giaritelli, Trump: Mexican President “Very Willing” to Accept US Troops in Drug Cartel 
Fight, WASH. EXAMINER (Feb. 5, 2017), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/trump-mexican-president-very-
willing-to-accept-us-troops-in-drug-cartel-fight/article/2613982; Vivian Salama, Trump to Mexico: Take Care 
of “Bad Hombres” or US Might, AP NEWS (Feb. 2, 2017), https://apnews.com/0b3f5db59b2e4aa78cdbbf 
008f27fb49.  
 4 Tom LoBianco, Donald Trump on Terrorists: ‘Take Out Their Families’, CNN (Dec. 3, 2015), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/02/politics/donald-trump-terrorists-families/index.html. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Kristina Wong, Trump: “I Will Not Order a Military Officer to Disobey the Law”, THE HILL (Mar. 4, 
2016), http://thehill.com/policy/defense/271823-trump-says-he-wont-order-military-to-violate-laws. 
 7 See Harold Koh, Why Do States Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2628 (1997). 
 8 See John B. Emerson, U.S. Ambassador to Germany, The Importance of a Rules-Based International 
Order, 14th Berlin Security Conference: Euro-Atlantic Partnership; Firm Anchor in a Turbulent World (Nov. 
17, 2015), available at https://de.usembassy.gov/the-importance-of-a-rules-based-international-order/. 
 9 Giaritelli, supra note 3. 
 10 LAURIE R. BLANK & GREGORY P. NOONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN THE LAW OF WAR 15 (2013). 
 11 Id. at 16. 
 12 See id. at 17. 
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remains is identifying the law that governs the military’s conduct once inside 
Mexico.  
Is it international humanitarian law (IHL) (i.e., jus in bello or law of armed 
conflict)? If there is no armed conflict in Mexico, then IHL is not applicable.13 
Is it international human rights law (IHRL)? The U.S. government holds the 
position, as discussed infra, that it has no treaty-based IHRL obligations in 
territories where it is not the controlling governmental authority. If neither IHL 
nor IHRL applies, the military could be ordered to conduct operations in a 
manner that is not too “politically correct” for President Trump. 
This Article concludes that there is no armed conflict in Mexico, so IHL 
would not apply, but that the U.S. military would be bound by IHRL while 
conducting operations against Mexican drug cartels. To that end, Part I of this 
Article provides background facts concerning the Mexican campaign against 
drug cartels. Part II considers why the Mexican drug cartel violence is not an 
armed conflict and why IHL is accordingly not applicable. Part III examines 
why IHRL is applicable. Part IV discusses how U.S. domestic law requires the 
President, and by extension the military, to follow IHRL. Part V offers 
concluding analysis. 
I. BACKGROUND ON MEXICAN “DRUG WAR” 
Part I(A) examines the drug cartel violence in Mexico. Part I(B) discusses 
the organizational structures of the drug cartels.  
A. Violence 
In 2006, Mexican President Felipe Calderón “declared war on the [drug] 
cartels.”14 President Calderón increased the number of Mexican soldiers tasked 
with fighting the drug cartels from 20,000 to 50,000.15 The Mexican drug 
cartels have violently resisted President Calderón’s crackdown. It is estimated 
that the ensuing violence resulted in a minimum of 80,000 deaths between 
2006 and 2015.16 The violence has spread, existing between cartels themselves 
 
 13 Id. at 83. 
 14 Ashley Fantz, The Mexico Drug War: Bodies for Billions, CNN (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2012/01/15/world/mexico-drug-war-essay/index.html. 
 15 Christopher Woody, After a Decade Fighting the Cartels, Mexico May Be Looking for a Way to Get 
Its Military Off the Front Line, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 13, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/mexican-
military-role-in-fighting-drug-war-and-cartels-2017-2. 
 16 BEITTEL, supra note 1, at 2. 
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and between the government and the cartels.17 It is predominantly marked by 
“shootouts” often involving the use of high caliber rifles and automatic 
weapons, the use of grenades, and sporadic use of car bombs.18 It has also 
included “coordinated attacks against the Mexican military” and, in one 
notable instance, the “downing of a military helicopter.”19 The violence can be 
gratuitous, as the drug cartels are known to dismember their murdered victims 
and attach messages to them. For example, “criminal groups and their allies 
deposited 14 headless bodies in front of the city hall” and “have left 18 
dismembered bodies in vans near Lake Chapala, an area frequented by tourists 
and U.S. retirees outside Guadalajara. They used a dump truck to unload 49 
more corpses, missing not only heads but also feet and hands, outside 
Monterrey, Mexico’s main industrial city.”20  
In 2011, the Mexican political scientist Eduardo Guerrero-Gutiérrez 
identified two types of drug cartel violence.21 The first is “drug-trafficking 
violence,” and the second is “mafia ridden violence.”22 Drug-trafficking 
violence intends “to maintain or gain control over drug-trafficking routes, 
points of entry and exit, and distribution markets.”23 Mafia-ridden violence is 
“kidnapping, extortion and executions” motivated by profit or to “keep or gain 
control over a limited territory (a few blocks of a neighborhood) in which the 
organization could run its illegal activities.”24 
In December 2012, Enrique Peña Nieto assumed the Office of the President 
of Mexico. Since then, the rate of drug cartel violence-related deaths has 
slowly declined.25 The cartels have instead, “furthered their expansion into 
other illegal activities, such as extortion, kidnapping, and oil theft, and the 
organizations now pose a multi-faceted organized criminal challenge to 
 
 17 Mexico Travel Warning, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/ 
alertswarnings/mexico-travel-warning.html/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2017). 
 18 Robert Beckhusen, The Tools of Mexico’s Drug Cartels, From Landmines to Monster Trucks, WIRED 
(Nov. 30, 2012), https://www.wired.com/2012/11/cartel-weapons/; Mexico Drug War Fast Facts, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/02/world/americas/mexico-drug-war-fast-facts/index.html (last visited Nov. 13, 
2017). 
 19 BEITTEL, supra note 1, at 27. 
 20 William Booth, Mexico’s Two Major Crime Cartels Now at War, WASH. POST (May 24, 2012), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/mexicos-two-major-crime-cartels-now-at-war/2012/05/24/gJQAUhKl 
mU_story.html?utm_term=.c198112c0dea. 
 21 EDUARDO GUERRERO-GUTIÉRREZ, SECURITY, DRUGS, AND VIOLENCE IN MEXICO: A SURVEY (2011), 
available at http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/93.securitydrugs.pdf. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 BEITTEL, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
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governance in Mexico . . . .”26 This suggests that “mafia ridden violence” is on 
the rise while “drug-trafficking violence” is on the decline. Indeed, the drug 
cartels’ expansion into other illegal activities can be understood as an adaptive 
means to achieve the cartels’ central aim: making money. Accordingly, “drug 
cartels are similar to legitimate profit-making enterprises. They seek to fill 
market demand or stimulate new demand for their products.”27  
The use of the Mexican military to combat the drug cartels has not been 
without criticism.28 The Mexican Defense Minister insists the military is not 
the right instrument for the anti-drug cartel campaign.29 The Defense Minister 
explains that the military is being used against the drug cartels to “chase 
criminals,” which is a mission for the police.30 The Defense Minister also 
claims it was a mistake to deploy the Mexican military against the drug cartels 
in the first place.31 The Defense Minister has also implied that the military is 
being used only because the Mexican police are so poorly trained.32 In other 
words, an assessment of the poor capabilities of the police appears to be the 
impetus for the use of the Mexican military against the drug cartels rather than 
the nature of the threat posed by the drug cartels themselves.  
B. Mexican Drug Cartels’ Organization 
It is also necessary to understand how the drug cartels are organized to 
properly analyze whether Mexican drug cartel violence is an armed conflict 
under international law. In 2015, the Congressional Research Service identified 
nine “major” Mexican drug cartels.33 These cartels generally appear to have an 
organizational structure that reflects a tiered hierarchy.34 At the top of this 
 
 26 Id. 
 27 Paul Kan, The Border Wall: Making Mexican Drug Cartels Great Again, WAR ON THE ROCKS 
(Feb. 2, 2017), https://warontherocks.com/2017/02/the-border-wall-making-mexican-drug-cartels-great-again/ 
(citation omitted). 
 28 Mexican Defense Minister: It’s “Unnatural” to Send the Military to Fight Drug Traffickers, BUS. 
INSIDER (Dec. 9, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/afp-unnatural-for-mexican-military-to-fight-drug-
trafficking-minister-2016-12. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Christopher Woody, Mexico’s Defense Chief: “We Have Committed Errors” in the War on Drugs, 
BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/mexico-defense-chief-we-have-committed-
errors-in-drug-war-2016-3.  
 32 Mexican Defense Minister: It’s “Unnatural” to Send the Military to Fight Drug Traffickers, supra 
note 28. 
 33 BEITTEL, supra note 1, at 13–26 (These “major” cartels are the: Tijuana/Arellano Felix Organization, 
Sinaloa, Juárez/Carrillo Fuentes Organization, Gulf, Los Zetas, Beltrán Leyva Organization, La Familia 
Michoacana, Knights Templar, and Cartel Jalisco-New Generation.). 
 34 Id.; see also Matt Dickenson, Leadership Transitions and Violence in Mexican Drug Trafficking 
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hierarchy are the “bosses,” followed by “specialized operators such as lawyers 
and accountants,” then come the “logistics operators,” and at the “lowest level 
is the operative base, composed by drug dealers, drivers and drug 
smugglers.”35 The exceptions to this common hierarchal structure are the 
Sinaloa and Los Zetas drug cartels. The Sinaloa cartel is comprised of semi-
autonomous branches operating under a single top leader who can pool 
together these branches when necessary.36 Los Zetas’ organization is believed 
to be similar to a franchise, or affiliated independent cells, rather than the 
classic tiered-hierarchy structure.37  
II. APPLICABILITY OF IHL 
Part II(A) examines the applicability of IHL generally. Part II(B) explains 
why IHL is not applicable to the Mexican drug cartel violence discussed above 
in Part I. Before proceeding, however, a cursory understanding of the 
differences between IHL and IHRL is necessary. Their differences in the 
treatment of taking lives and the arresting or imprisoning of individuals are the 
most germane and illustrative. The use of force to take the life of an enemy 
combatant is lawful as a first resort under IHL.38 IHL further accepts and even 
expects such use of force will cause a certain amount of collateral damage, 
including the death of innocent civilians.39 IHL also permits the detention of 
combatants for the duration of hostilities40 or non-combatants when “the 
security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary.”41 IHRL, on the 
other hand, regulates the use of force to take a life as an “exceptional” measure 
used only as a last resort in response to an imminent threat to the lives of 
others.42 Arrest or imprisonment must be done on the basis of individualized, 
 
Organizations, 2006–2010 (2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2001405 
(extrapolating that the larger cartels will have a “somewhat more formal and hierarchical leadership structure” 
by comparing the cartels to known Mexican criminal organizational structures). 
 35 GUERRERO-GUTIÉRREZ, supra note 21. 
 36 Dickenson, supra note 34. 
 37 BEITTEL, supra note 1. 
 38 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 3, 25 (2005), available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/ 
pcustom.htm. 
 39 Id. at 46. 
 40 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 21 and 118, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Convention III]. 
 41 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 42, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Convention IV]. 
 42 See G.A. Res. 34/169, Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officers, art. 3, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/34/169 (Dec. 17, 1979). 
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non-arbitrary judgment43 (i.e., conduct-based deprivations as opposed to IHL’s 
status-based deprivations).44  
A. Applicability of IHL Generally 
Before analyzing IHL’s applicability to the Mexican drug cartel violence, it 
is first necessary to discuss the application of IHL generally. IHL is applied in 
the event of either an international armed conflict (IAC) or, in a more limited 
manner, a non-international armed conflict (NIAC). An IAC exists if the 
conditions of Article 2 common to all four Geneva Conventions (CA 2) are 
satisfied.45 CA 2 requires either a declared war or an armed conflict between 
two states.46 In the case of a NIAC, the conditions of Article 3 common to all 
four Geneva Conventions (CA 3) must be fulfilled.47 CA 3 is trigged by an 
“armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of 
one of the High Contracting Parties.”48  
The Geneva Conventions are universally adopted, thereby alleviating CA 
3’s requirement that a NIAC occur “in the territory of one of the High 
Contracting Parties.”49 It is also established that “not of an international 
character” describes an armed conflict that is not between two states.50 Left 
unsettled is the meaning of “armed conflict.” This section examines its 
meaning as understood by (1) the International Committee of the Red Cross 
 
 43 See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 9, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 
1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
 44 Chris Jenks, Reimagining the Wheel: Detention and Release of Non-State Actors Under the 
Geneva Conventions, in DETENTION OF NON-STATE ACTORS ENGAGED IN HOSTILITIES 93, 103 (Gregory 
Rose & Bruce Oswald eds., 2016). 
 45 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces 
in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6. U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Convention I]; Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention II]; Convention III, 
supra note 40, art. 2; Convention IV, supra note 41, art. 2 (Common Article 2); see How is the Term “Armed 
Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law?, INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (Mar. 2008), 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf [hereinafter ICRC Armed 
Conflict]. 
 46 Convention I, supra note 45; Convention II, supra note 45; Convention III, supra note 40, art. 2; 
Convention IV, supra note 41, art. 2. 
 47 Convention I, supra note 45, art. 3; Convention II, supra note 45, art. 3; Convention III, supra note 
40, art. 3; Convention IV, supra note 41, art. 3. 
 48 Convention I, supra note 45, art. 3; Convention II, supra note 45, art. 3; Convention III, supra note 
40, art. 3; Convention IV, supra note 41, art. 3. 
 49 Convention III, supra note 40, art. 3. 
 50 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 562 (2006); ICRC Armed Conflict, supra note 45. 
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(ICRC) commentary to CA 3;51 (2) Article 1 of Additional Protocol II of 1977 
(AP II)52 and the ICRC’s commentary to AP II;53 and, (3) the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
1. ICRC Commentary to CA 3 
The ICRC has twice published commentaries to CA 3, once in 1952 and 
again in 2016. The 2016 commentary references the 1952 commentary’s 
criteria in addressing the threshold issue of identifying what violence triggers 
CA 3’s applicability and otherwise largely discusses the international criminal 
tribunals’ approach to this threshold issue.54 Because this Article similarly 
addresses the international jurisprudence, its scope is limited to discussing the 
1952 commentary. 
The 1952 ICRC commentary explains that an “armed conflict” is not “a 
mere act of banditry or an unorganized and short-lived insurrection.”55 The 
ICRC’s commentary provides four non-binding criteria to help distinguish 
between an armed conflict and these examples.56 The criteria are indicia of an 
armed conflict and need not all be satisfied for an armed conflict to exist. 
Taken together, the criteria suggest two predicate factual conditions for an 
armed conflict to legally exist. First, the non-state actor’s violence is 
endeavored upon (in whole or in part) to create a new or rival government to 
the de jure government. Second, the violence has seized the international 
community’s attention. The non-binding criteria are:  
(1) That the Party in revolt against the de jure Government possesses 
an organized military force, an authority responsible for its acts, 
acting within a determinate territory and having the means of 
respecting and ensuring respect for the Convention. 
(2) That the legal Government is obliged to have recourse to the 
regular military forces against insurgents organized as military and in 
possession of a part of the national territory. 
 
 51 ICRC, 1 THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 COMMENTARY 49–50 (Jean S. Pictet ed. 
1952), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/GC_1949-I.pdf [hereinafter Pictet]. 
 52 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art.1, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 611 
[hereinafter Protocol II]. 
 53 ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 1307 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds. 1987), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_ 
Law/pdf/Commentary_GC_Protocols.pdf [hereinafter Sandoz]. 
 54 Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, ICRC, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCi-
commentary (The 2016 commentaries are published electronically, side-by-side with the prior 1952 version). 
 55 Pictet, supra note 51, at 49. 
 56 Id. at 49–50.  
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(3) (a) That the de jure Government has recognized the insurgents as 
belligerents; or 
(b) That it has claimed for itself the rights of a belligerent; or 
(c) That it has accorded the insurgents recognition as belligerents for 
the purposes only of the present Convention; or 
(d) That the dispute has been admitted to the agenda of the Security 
Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations as being a 
threat to international peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of 
aggression. 
(4) (a) That the insurgents have an organization purporting to have 
the characteristics of a State. 
(b) That the insurgent civil authority exercises de facto authority over 
persons within a determinate territory. 
(c) That the armed forces act under the direction of the organized 
civil authority and are prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war. 
(d) That the insurgent civil authority agrees to be bound by the 
provisions of the Convention.57 
The existence of the first predicate condition—that the non-state actor is 
using violence to create a rival government—is supported by criterion one, 
criterion two, and subsections (a), (b), and (c) of criterion four. The use of 
“means” within criterion one suggests the existence of a system or procedure 
to adjudicate violations of the Convention. CA 3 explicitly prohibits the 
sentencing of individuals for violations of the Conventions unless the sentence 
is adjudged by a “regularly constituted court” capable of “affording all the 
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 
peoples.”58 Therefore, the first criterion is likely appropriating CA 3’s defined 
judicial protections as indicia that an armed conflict legally exists in the first 
place. The second criterion suggests the de jure government’s presence in part 
of its national territory is only achieved through the exercise of military force 
against the “insurgents”59 who are otherwise in control of that territory. 
Subsection (a) of the fourth criterion requires the insurgents “have the 
characteristics of a State.” The four characteristics of a state most commonly 
accepted by international law are: (1) a permanent population; (2) a defined  
  
 
 57 Id. 
 58 Convention I, supra note 45, art. 3; Convention II, supra note 45, art. 3; Convention III, supra note 
40, art. 3; Convention IV, supra note 41, art. 3. 
 59 An “insurgent” is defined as “[a] person fighting against a government or invading force; a rebel or 
revolutionary.” Insurgent, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ 
insurgent (last visited Nov. 13, 2017) (online edition). A “revolutionary” is defined as “[a] person who 
advocates or engages in political revolution.” Revolutionary, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://en. 
oxforddictionaries.com/definition/revolutionary (last visited Nov. 13, 2017) (online edition). 
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territory; (3) a government; and (4) the ability to enter into relations with other 
nations.60 Subsection (b) of the fourth criterion first establishes the non-state 
actor’s “civil authority” as a point of consideration while subsection (c) 
elevates the importance of considering the civil authority by subordinating the 
insurgents’ military branch to its civil authority. Subsections (a), (b), and (c), 
considered together, imply that the non-state actor is not only resisting the de 
jure government’s civil and police authority but is also exercising civil 
authority over a defined territory in a way that prejudices the de jure 
government’s ability to do the same. 
The second implied predicate condition—that the conflict has demanded 
the international community’s attention—is evidenced by the third criterion 
and subsections (c) and (d) of the fourth criterion. The third criterion requires 
either the non-state actor party to the conflict to claim “belligerent” status or 
that the state actor party to the conflict label them as such. This is tantamount 
to recommending that a party to the conflict has invoked international law as 
applicable. The third criterion also considers whether the U.N. Security 
Council or General Assembly has taken notice of the violence as a “threat to 
international peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.”61 
Subsections (c) and (d) of the fourth criterion suggest the non-state actor is 
willing to both adhere to international law by “observ[ing] the ordinary laws of 
war” and “be bound by the provisions of the [Geneva Conventions].”62 These 
criteria suggest that the non-state actor’s struggle is, at least in part, to legally 
enter and be recognized by the international community.  
2. Additional Protocol II of 1977 
A second authoritative source on the meaning of “armed conflict” is AP II. 
Mexico and the United States are not parties to AP II, and AP II’s terms only 
apply to territories of parties to the Protocol. Nonetheless, “[m]any provisions 
of [AP II] can now be regarded as declaratory of existing rules or as having 
crystallized emerging rules of customary law or else as having been strongly 
instrumental in their evolution as general principles.”63 The U.S. Department 
of Defense cites to AP II’s test for “[d]istinguishing Armed Conflict From 
 
 60 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, opened for signature Dec. 26, 1933, 49 
Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19. 
 61 Pictet, supra note 51, at 49–50. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, para. 117 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
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Internal Disturbances and Tensions.”64 The United States also agrees that 
customary international law is part of the larger corpus of the law of armed 
conflict that the United States must obey.65 Therefore AP II’s definition of a 
NIAC is very persuasive, if not authoritative. 
AP II adopts a narrower definition of a NIAC by creating three 
requirements in addition to CA 3’s. AP II requires that the conflict be between 
“[1] armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups 
which, [2] under responsible command, [3] exercise such control over a part of 
its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations and to implement [AP II].”66 Because AP II’s requirements are in 
addition to, rather than in place of, CA 3’s, it is possible to have an armed 
conflict for the purposes of CA 3 but not for AP II. Additionally, AP II rejects 
“situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and 
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature” as being armed 
conflicts.67 The ICRC commentary to AP II explains that “internal tensions” 
can include “internal disturbances, without being an armed conflict, when the 
State uses armed force to maintain order; there are internal tensions, without 
being internal disturbances, when force is used as a preventive measure to 
maintain respect for law and order.”68 
AP II’s requirement for such control of territory permitting the 
implementation of AP II’s provisions is its most significant additional 
requirement. For example, Article 4 of AP II requires, inter alia, the non-state 
actor to educate children in the territory under its control. 69 Article 5 requires, 
inter alia, the non-state actor to maintain and operate detention facilities in 
which males and females are housed separately to ensure that those detained 
receive adequate medical treatment and spiritual assistance.70 Finally, Article 6 
requires, inter alia, the non-state actor to set up a penal system with some 
minimum levels of due process for the adjudication of crimes their detainees 
may have committed.71 These requirements are illustrative of the tremendous 
resources, organization, and commitment that is required of the non-state actor 
 
 64 U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL 83 (2016), https://www. 
defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20Manual%20-%20June%202015%20 
Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-190. 
 65 Id. at 8. 
 66 Protocol II, supra note 52, art. 1. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Sandoz, supra note 53. 
 69 Protocol II, supra note 52, art. 4. 
 70 Id. art. 5. 
 71 Id. art. 6. 
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to implement AP II. They also suggest that, for a NIAC to exist under AP II, 
the non-state actor must exercise some competence in governing people within 
a territory. 
3. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
A third authoritative source for defining “armed conflict” is international 
case law developed by the ICTY. The ICTY Appeals Chamber in The 
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić (Tadić) found a CA 3 “armed conflict exists 
whenever there is . . . protracted armed violence between governmental 
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a 
State.”72 Subsequent treatment of “protracted” has turned on measuring the 
“intensity” of the conflict.73 For example, the Tadić Trial Chamber focused “on 
two aspects of a conflict; the intensity of the conflict and the organization of 
the parties to the conflict.”74 These “intensity” and “organization” prongs are 
used to legally differentiate an internal disturbance from an armed conflict.75 
Tadić also offers “terrorist activities” as a third example of what is not an 
“armed conflict” but otherwise fails to identify the thresholds that satisfy its 
two-prong test. The Tadić Trial Chamber commends the ICRC commentary’s 
non-binding criteria (discussed above) as relevant to making this threshold 
determination on a case-by-case basis. The Tadić tribunal noted the following 
circumstances as relevant to its finding that an “armed conflict” legally existed 
in Yugoslavia: the conflict was between organized political parties; the party in 
“revolt against the de jure government” controlled territory; the violence was 
protracted and involved “artillery bombardments” that lasted up to three days 
at a time, resulting in the whole destruction of villages; and the intensity of the 
violence “ensured the continuous involvement of the Security Council.”76 
These circumstances seem to mirror consideration of the ICRC commentary’s 
non-binding criteria.  
After Tadić, in the 2005 case Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj, the ICTY Trial 
Chamber noted that the ICRC commentary’s criteria are non-binding and 
instead relied on other factors indicative of the “intensity of a conflict and the 
 
 72 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, para. 70 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
 73 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Judgment of the Trial Chamber, para. 562 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997); see also Abella v. Argentina (Tablada Base Case), Case 
11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. (1997). 
 74 Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Judgment of the Trial Chamber, para. 562. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. paras. 563–68.  
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organization of the parties.”77 The court explained that these factors relate to 
“factual matters which need to be decided in light of the particular evidence 
and on a case-by-case basis.”78 In the 2012 Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, 
Idriz Balaj, and Lahi Brahimaj (Brahimaj) decision, the ICTY Trial Chamber 
cited a list of factors the ICTY had developed since Limaj to “assess the 
intensity” of a conflict.79 These factors include:  
the distribution of weapons among both parties to the conflict; 
involvement of the UN Security Council; number of civilians forced 
to flee from the combat zones; types of weapons used, particularly 
heavy weapons, and other military equipment, such as tanks and 
other heavy vehicles; the blockading or besieging of towns and heavy 
shelling of towns; the extent of destruction and number of casualties 
caused by shelling or fighting; the quantity of troops and units 
deployed; existence and change of front lines between the parties; the 
occupation of territory, towns and villages; the deployment of 
government forces to the crisis area; closure of roads; cease fire 
orders and agreements.80  
In applying these factors to the facts before it, the Brahimaj tribunal 
notably held that despite the “shelling of villages,” the requisite level of 
“intensity” had not been satisfied and therefore there was legally no “armed 
conflict” during the time relevant to the tribunal’s consideration.81 These 
factors, considering the manner that the Brahimaj tribunal applied them, 
suggest the “intensity” prong is a high bar to overcome. 
In the 2008 ICTY case Prosecutor v. Ljube Boškoski and Johan 
Tarculovski (Boškoski), the ICTY reviewed how the “organizational” prong 
must be considered. Boškoski articulates five different factors for 
consideration: (1) whether the group is organized into a military command 
structure (e.g., squad, platoon, company, battalion, brigade); (2) whether the 
group is able to conduct operations in an organized manner; (3) whether the 
group has a logistical capacity to support military operations; (4) whether the 
group has an internal disciplinary system and the ability to adhere to IHL; and 
(5) whether the group can “speak with one voice.”82 These factors suggest a 
 
 77 Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment of the Trial Chamber, paras. 85, 90 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Prosecutor v. Haradinaj (Brahimaj), Case No. IT-04-84bis-T, Judgment of the Trial Chamber, para. 
394 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 2012). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. paras. 404, 410–11 (emphasis added). 
 82 Prosecutor v. Boškoski (Boškoski), Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment of the Trial Chamber, paras. 
199–203 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008), aff’d, Boškoski et al., IT-04-82-T, 
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lower bar for the “organization” prong because they largely do not require 
actual organizational fidelity but merely require the potential to do so—for 
example, the “ability to determine a unified military strategy” rather than 
having actually determined a unified military strategy.83 
B. Application of IHL to Mexican Drug Cartel Violence 
The above authorities guide the analysis of IHL’s applicability to Mexican 
drug cartel violence. First, it is evident that Mexican drug cartel violence is 
“not of an international character” as the conflict is not between two states. 
The issue remains whether the violence is an “armed conflict.” Part (1) of this 
section applies the ICRC commentary to CA 3’s analysis to the facts 
concerning the Mexican drug cartel violence. Part (2) is an AP II analysis of 
the drug cartel violence. Part (3) is a comparison of the drug cartel violence to 
the ICTY’s treatment. Part (4) compares the drug cartel violence to the 
examples of what is not an “armed conflict”.  
1. Application of ICRC’s Commentary to CA 3 
There is no evidence that satisfies the ICRC criteria’s first predicate 
condition: that the non-state actor is attempting, through violence, to create a 
new or rival government to the de jure government. For example, the drug 
cartels have not established a system of justice to ensure their conduct is in 
accordance with CA 3. The drug cartels do not possess territory over which 
they exercise civil authority, nor do the drug cartels purport to have any of the 
characteristics of a state. Lastly, Mexican military officials do not feel 
“obliged” to respond to the drug cartels with military force. Some may argue 
otherwise, pointing to the actual use of Mexican military against the cartels as 
evidence that it is so “obliged.” The Defense Minister’s statements largely 
characterizing the use of the military against the drug cartels as a folly weigh 
heavily against this argument. The statements are persuasive evidence that 
Mexico is not bound by the circumstances to use its military but has instead 
chosen to do so only for practical expediency. Therefore, the first, second, and 
fourth ICRC criteria, as applied here, suggest that the violence is not an armed 
conflict.  
The second predicate condition—that the conflict has demanded the 
international community’s attention—is similarly left unsatisfied by the facts. 
 
Judgement of the Appeals Chamber, para. 23 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 19, 2010). 
 83 Boškoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment of the Trial Chamber, para. 200. 
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The violence has not entered the international plane. No party is reported as 
declaring the drug cartels “belligerents.” Neither the U.N. General Assembly 
nor U.N. Security Council is involved with the Mexican drug cartel violence, 
and the drug cartels have evidenced no willingness to observe IHL.  
Reference to the ICRC commentary therefore suggests that the Mexican 
drug cartel violence is not a NIAC. It follows that IHL would not be 
applicable. Yet, the ICRC commentary is persuasive but not controlling 
authority. It is therefore worthwhile to continue the analysis of whether an 
armed conflict exists in Mexico. 
2. Application of AP II 
The first two requirements of AP II are satisfied by the facts surrounding 
the Mexican drug cartel violence. First, the violence is, at least in part, between 
a state actor and a non-state actor. Second, the drug cartels’ organizational 
hierarchy satisfies the “responsible command structure” requirement. With 
respect to the third criterion, the coordinated and, at times, successful nature of 
the “shootouts” against the Mexican military demonstrates the cartels’ ability 
to carry out sustained and concerted military operations. Nonetheless, the third 
criterion is not satisfied, as the cartels have not exercised such control over 
territory to implement the requirements of AP II.84 For example, there is no 
indication that the drug cartels can perform the functions concerning the 
education of children, the detention of prisoners, the medical treatment of 
prisoners, or the establishment of a penal system. As one report from Mexico 
poignantly stated, “none interviewed could point to a single public work, 
school or hospital built or funded by [a drug cartel kingpin].”85 The elements 
for finding an “armed conflict” pursuant to AP II are not all satisfied, and the 
application of IHL to the violence would be baseless within the AP II 
framework.  
3. Comparison to ICTY’s Treatment of CA 3 
An examination of the ICTY’s jurisprudence concerning CA 3 confirms 
the conclusion that there is not an armed conflict in Mexico. Consider the 
Tadić test where both the “intensity of the conflict and the organization of the 
 
 84 Protocol II, supra note 52. 
 85 Deborah Bonello, In His Hometown, Fugitive Mexican Drug Lord ‘El Chapo’ is a Hero to Many, 
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-mexico-culiacan-guzman-
20150810-story.html. 
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parties to the conflict” determine the existence of an “armed conflict.”86 First, 
the “organization” prong, as clarified by Boškoski,87 is satisfied by the “major” 
drug cartels. The “intensity” prong, however, is not satisfied. Having already 
referenced the ICRC’s commentary as recommended by Tadić, attention must 
next be given to the Tadić progeny’s treatment of “intensity.”  
The balance of the Brahimaj factors weigh in favor of finding the Mexican 
drug cartel violence does not satisfy the “intensity” prong. Although the 
violence has exacted significant numbers of casualties and many troops have 
been engaged, the remaining considerations cut in the other direction. For 
example, the military is calling for a reduced (if not eliminated) role; neither 
the U.N. Security Council nor the General Assembly are involved in the 
situation; the use of artillery, tanks, and other heavy vehicles is not reported; 
towns are not besieged; towns are not shelled; “front lines” are not established 
and changed; and there are no ceasefire orders and agreements. No single 
Brahimaj factor is required to answer the threshold question, and an 
international tribunal considering their aggregate weight would find the 
balance in favor of determining that the Mexican drug cartel violence is an 
internal disturbance. The ICTY jurisprudence, therefore, also suggests IHL is 
not applicable.  
4. Comparison to Negative Examples of an “Armed Conflict” 
The Mexican drug cartel violence is also more akin to the examples of 
what is not an armed conflict. Specifically, as noted above, banditry, 
unorganized or short-lived insurrections, acts of terrorism, and situations of 
internal disturbances and tensions cannot legally be considered “armed 
conflicts.” Banditry is the plural of bandit, or “a robber or outlaw belonging to 
a gang and typically operating in an isolated or lawless area.”88 An 
“insurrection” is “[t]he action of rising in arms or open resistance against 
established authority or governmental restraint . . . .”89 Mexican drug cartel 
violence is centered on creating lawlessness and is therefore similar to the 
disavowed “banditry.” On the other hand, the drug cartel violence is organized 
and protracted—it is directed at the government and also occurs between the 
 
 86 Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Judgment of the Trial Chamber, para. 562. 
 87 Boškoski Trial Chamber, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment of the Trial Chamber, paras. 199–203. 
 88 Bandit, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/bandit (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2017) (online edition). 
 89 Insurrection, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ 
insurrection (last visited Nov. 13, 2017) (online edition). 
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drug cartels. In this light, the drug cartel violence might be an “armed conflict” 
as compared to the “short-lived insurrection” example.  
The “terrorist activities” example given by Tadić appears to lend more 
credibility to the conclusion that the drug violence is not legally an armed 
conflict.90 Yet using “terrorist activities” for comparison purposes is nebulous 
for two reasons: first, because “terrorism” is widely defined, and second, 
because the U.S. War on Terror might contradict the premise that “terrorist 
activities” are still a valid example of what is not an armed conflict. 
Nonetheless, two international instruments have defined terrorism and serve as 
persuasive authorities for how “terrorism” is understood by international law. 
First, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism in 1999, to which 188 states are parties, defines terrorism as:  
act[s] intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or 
to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a 
situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its 
nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a 
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from 
doing any act.91  
Second, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1566 defines terrorism as: 
[c]riminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent 
to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the 
purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group 
of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a 
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from 
doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as 
defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to 
terrorism . . . .92 
Using these definitions, the pattern of drug cartel violence trending towards 
the sort characterized as “mafia ridden” suggests the violence is not an “armed 
conflict.” Instead, the drug cartel violence is understood as intending to 
“intimidate [the Mexican] population” or to “compel [the Mexican] 
government . . . to abstain from [enforcing its drug laws].”93 In this respect, the 
drug cartel violence is the same kind of violence associated with terrorism as 
 
 90 Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Judgment of the Trial Chamber, para. 562. 
 91 Int’l Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 
(Dec. 9, 1999). 
 92 S.C. Res.1566, ¶ 3 (Oct. 8, 2004). 
 93 See id. 
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defined by the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing 
of Terrorism and Security Council Resolution 1566. 
Additionally, the U.S. War on Terror provides counterexamples of when 
terrorist activities can be considered part in parcel to an “armed conflict,” but it 
does not operate to entirely discredit the use of “terrorist activities” as an 
example of what an armed conflict is not. The War on Terror is distinguishable 
from the Mexican drug cartel violence in at least two ways. First, the Mexican 
drug cartel violence presents a transnational issue, whereas the War on Terror 
presents an international issue.94 Second, the United States and Al Qaeda have 
each recognized the existence of an armed conflict between each other.95 The 
use of the “terrorist activities” example therefore supports the conclusion that 
the drug cartel violence is not an armed conflict. 
Lastly, consideration of AP II’s proscription of “situations of internal 
disturbances and tensions” from being a legal armed conflict96 confirms the 
conclusions that there is no NIAC in Mexico. The drug cartel’s violence is 
intended to deconstruct law-abiding behavior in Mexico so that illicit business 
may succeed. This has created a strained state between the proponents of this 
lawlessness, the cartels, and Mexico. Furthermore, and as noted above, the 
ICRC’s commentary to AP II establishes that the military forces may be used 
in certain instances to maintain respect for law and order without violence 
being considered an armed conflict.97 Mexican military officials’ statements 
demonstrate the use of the military as a law enforcement tool against 
“criminals.” The Mexican drug cartel violence, although significant, is 
consequently a Mexican “internal disturbance.”  
  
 
 94 See S.C. Res. 1377 (Nov. 12, 2001) (“Transnational issue” used here means the drug cartel violence 
is embedded in Mexico but at times transcends its borders, whereas “international issue” used here means it 
has seized the attention of the U.N. Security Council and therefore exists on a level above the states as 
independent sovereigns). 
 95 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Dominic Tierney, The Twenty Years’ War, THE 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/08/twenty-years-war/ 
496736/; see also Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 96 Protocol II, supra note 52, art. 1. 
 97 Sandoz, supra note 53, at 1319–1320. 
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III. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
Although IHL should not govern the conduct of a potential U.S. military 
intervention into Mexican drug cartel violence, the United States still has legal 
obligations under IHRL. The United States is a party to seventeen human 
rights treaties.98 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), however, is the most relevant. Part III(A) considers the application 
of the ICCPR to the potential use of military force in Mexico. Part III(B) 
considers the implications of the United States signing (but not ratifying) the 
American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention). Finally, Part 
III(C) considers human rights as customary international law.  
A. The ICCPR 
The ICCPR articulates several individual human rights. Article 6(1) 
promulgates a non-derogable right to life comprised of three separate, but 
related, conditions: (1) everyone has the right to life; (2) that right must be 
protected by law; and (3) no one can be arbitrarily deprived of life.99 Article 
6(1) thus establishes a foundational right to life that is mutually supported by a 
“positive obligation” of governments to protect that right and a “negative 
obligation” preventing that right from being arbitrarily taken. With respect to 
rights concerning arrest or imprisonment, Article 9 provides that “[e]veryone 
has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest or detention.”100 Therefore, the ICCPR constrains the U.S. 
military in Mexico to not arbitrarily: (1) take life; and (2) arrest or imprison 
people. The U.S. executive branch does not, however, share this conclusion, as 
discussed above. 
The ICCPR also provides for how these rights will be ensured by the 
treaty’s parties. Article 2(1) states “[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant . . . .”101 
Article 5(1) qualifies the general statement of Article 2(1) by providing: 
[n]othing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for 
any State . . . any right to engage in any activity or perform any act 
 
 98 Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties - USA, UNIV. MINN. HUM. RTS. LIBR., 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/ratification-USA.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2017). 
 99 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) arts. 4(2) and 6(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171. 
 100 Id. art. 9(1). 
 101 Id. art. 2(1). 
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aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized 
herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in 
the present Covenant.102  
In other words, Article 2(1) creates an affirmative obligation to protect 
human rights within the United States’ territory and jurisdiction while 
Article 5(1) prohibits the United States from taking actions that destroy the 
rights of anyone beyond the United States’ territory and jurisdiction. The 
Human Rights Committee (HRC),103 in General Comment Thirty-One, 
similarly concluded:  
Parties are required by article 2, paragraph 1, to respect and to ensure 
the Covenant . . . . This principle also applies to those within the 
power or effective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside 
its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or 
effective control was obtained, such as forces constituting a national 
contingent of a State Party assigned to an international peace-keeping 
or peace-enforcement operation.104 
The U.S. government’s executive branch rejects the legal conclusion 
that the ICCPR imposes limits on its extraterritorial actions.105 In March 
2014, before the HRC, the United States affirmed the position it has held 
since 1995: “the [ICCPR] applies only to individuals both within its 
territory and within its jurisdiction . . . .”106 In November 2014, the United 
States moved closer to, but not congruent with, the HRC’s effective control 
test when it announced that its obligations under the Convention Against 
Torture (as opposed to the ICCPR) “apply in places outside the United 
States that the U.S. government controls as a governmental authority.”107  
 
 102 Id. art. 5(1). 
 103 Id. Part IV details the make and functions of the Human Rights Committee. Id. arts. 28–45. The 
drafting and promulgating general comments regarding the ICCPR is not necessarily an obvious function of 
the committee from the articles of the ICCPR; the Committee has nonetheless made it a practice. Off. of the 
U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Civil and Political Rights, Factsheet No. 15 (Rev. 1) 15 (2005), http://www. 
ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet15rev.1en.pdf. 
 104 U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed 
on States Parties to the Covenant, art. 2(1), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add13. 
 105 Charlie Savage, U.S., Rebuffing U.N., Maintains Stance That Rights Treaty Does Not Apply Abroad, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/14/world/us-affirms-stance-that-rights-treaty-
doesnt-apply-abroad.html. 
 106 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Mary McLeod, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State). 
 107 Press Release, Bernadette Meehan, Spokesperson, National Security Council, U.S. Presentation to the 
Committee Against Torture (Nov. 12, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/ 
12/statement-nsc-spokesperson-bernadette-meehan-us-presentation-committee-a. 
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Using either of the executive branch’s interpretations, the U.S. military 
would not be constrained by either IHL or IHRL in Mexico and, thus, legally 
free to arbitrarily kill or arrest and imprison Mexicans. In the face of a 
manifestly absurd or unreasonable interpretation of a treaty, Article 32 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides recourse to 
“supplementary means of interpretation” of a treaty’s text.108 In 2010, the 
Office of the Legal Adviser at the Department of State drafted a legal opinion 
that did resort to supplementary means of interpretation.109 In this opinion, the 
Legal Adviser concluded that, in light of “(1) the [ICCPR’s] language in 
context; (2) object and purpose; (3) negotiating history; (4) U.S. positions; (5) 
interpretations of other States Parties; (6) interpretations of the Human Rights 
Committee; and (7) ICJ rulings,”110 the United States is obligated to “respect 
rights under its control in circumstances in which the [United States] exercises 
authority or effective control over a particular person or context without regard 
to territory.”111 Should the issue become justiciable, the 2010 Legal Adviser’s 
Opinion presents a strong argument that is supported by the HRC’s General 
Comment Thirty-One. Furthermore, a plain reading of ICCPR’s Articles 2(1) 
and 5(1) support concluding that the ICCPR has (at least some) extraterritorial 
regulatory effect. It is therefore likely a Court would find the U.S. military 
bound by the ICCPR to respect the human rights of individuals in Mexico who 
find themselves under the U.S. military’s effective control. 
B. The American Convention 
The American Convention separately sets forth binding IHRL obligations. 
These obligations often mirror those traced to the ICCPR. For example, Article 
4(1) of the American Convention states: “Every person has the right to have 
his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the 
moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”112 
 
 108 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]; The United States is not a party to this treaty but considers it representative 
of customary international law. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www. 
state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2017). 
 109 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE OFF. OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, MEMORANDUM OPINION ON THE GEOGRAPHIC 
SCOPE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (2010), https://www. 
documentcloud.org/documents/1053853-state-department-iccpr-memo.html [hereinafter DEP’T OF STATE 
LEGAL ADVISER]. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 112 American Convention on Human Rights art. 4(1), Nov. 21, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143. 
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Convention Article 7(3) provides, inter alia, that “[n]o one shall be subject to 
arbitrary arrest or imprisonment.”113  
Mexico is a party to the American Convention.114 The United States has 
signed, but has not ratified, the American Convention, and therefore has a 
customary international legal obligation to not defeat the treaty’s object and 
purpose.115 There are several tests used to determine whether a state has 
defeated the object and purpose of a treaty. By almost every measure discussed 
below, the United States cannot take action that the American Convention 
prohibits Mexico from taking without defeating the American Convention’s 
object and purpose.  
The first measure is the “essential elements test,” which requires a 
signatory to “comply with the most important parts” of the treaty.116 It cannot 
be successfully argued that the right to not have your life arbitrarily taken and 
the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment are not “important 
parts” of the American Convention. Every other right a person might enjoy 
under the American Convention presupposes they are alive and free to enjoy it. 
Therefore, these two rights are “important parts” of the treaty, and the United 
States taking action that violates their protections would defeat the object and 
purpose of the American Convention.  
A second test is the “impossible performance test.” This test holds that the 
“object and purpose is defeated if subsequent performance of the treaty 
becomes impossible or ‘meaningless.’”117 If a state arbitrarily kills an 
individual, then performance of the treaty vis-à-vis that individual is 
impossible because the right to life is an individual human right rather than a 
collective right. The same cannot be said with respect to arbitrary arrest or 
imprisonment because the individual who is arbitrarily arrested or imprisoned 
can be subsequently released and, thus, performance of the treaty remains 
possible.  
The final two tests are similar and worth discussing at once. They are the 
“bad faith test” and the “manifest intent test.” The “bad faith test” holds that “a 
 
 113 Id. art. 7(3). 
 114 American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica” (B-32), ORG. AM. STATES, 
http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2017). 
 115 Id.; VCLT, supra note 108. 
 116 David S. Jonas & Thomas N. Sanders, The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretive 
Methods, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 565, 596 (2010). 
 117 Id. at 598. 
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state violates [the object and purpose of a treaty] if its actions are unwarranted 
or condemnable, while under the manifest intent test, the actions need only 
‘seem unwarranted and condemnable . . . regardless of actual proof of bad 
faith.’”118 With respect to the “bad faith test,” it is difficult to imagine how the 
use of military force to arbitrarily kill and arrest or imprison individuals for 
prolonged periods would be done in good faith. The bad faith test would 
therefore likely find actions taken to kill and arrest or imprison drug cartel 
members, on the sole basis of their membership in a drug cartel, as running 
afoul of the object and purpose of the American Convention. Under the 
“manifest intent test,” the use of military force outside the context of an armed 
conflict to arbitrarily kill and detain Mexicans would seem unwarranted and 
condemnable and are, thus, repugnant to the object and purpose of the 
American Convention. 
Some may argue, however, that the “bad faith” and the “manifest intent” 
tests conclude the opposite. This argument would be premised on a belief that 
there is a legitimate security basis for killing or arresting and imprisoning drug 
cartel members given the nature of their criminal activity and the threat they 
pose. The argument would follow that using lethal force against or arresting 
and imprisoning drug cartel members is therefore not arbitrary or in bad faith. 
This argument hinges on whether a state’s legitimate security basis satisfies the 
American Convention’s proscription against the “arbitrary” taking of life and 
the “arbitrary arrest or imprisonment.” 
This argument fails on its face with respect to the American Convention’s 
non-derogable right to life. Article 27(1) of the American Convention 
disavows any legitimate security basis for the suspension of the right to life.119 
In other words, the U.S. military cannot have a good faith basis to use lethal 
force in Mexico against drug cartel members solely because of their 
membership in a drug cartel. The only good faith basis under the American 
Convention for using lethal force is if a drug cartel member presents an 
imminent threat to others (i.e., just because that individual has violated the law 
does not give license to the United States to use lethal force).  
With respect to arbitrary arrest or imprisonment of an individual, pursuant 
to Articles 27(1) and 27(2) of the American Convention, an arrest or 
imprisonment based on an individual’s membership in a drug cartel (as 
opposed to their suspected violation of the law) can only be done in good faith 
 
 118 Id. at 602 (quoting Jan Klabbers, How to Defeat a Treaty’s Object and Purpose Pending Entry into 
Force: Toward Manifest Intent, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 283, 330 (2001)). 
 119 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 112, arts. 27(1), 27(2). 
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if there is a nexus between the arrest or imprisonment and exigent 
circumstances that threaten the “independence or security” of Mexico.120 
Given the context, it is likely that the United States would argue that the drug 
cartel members threaten the “security” of Mexico. Convention Article 27(2)’s 
coordinated conjunction between “independence” and “security” (i.e., the 
independence and security of Mexico are equally important) requires, however, 
that the security risk be comparable in gravity to the loss of Mexico’s 
continued independence. As established above in Part II(B), the Mexican drug 
cartels present a significant security risk but not to the extent that they threaten 
the independence of Mexico. It is therefore unlikely that this argument would 
succeed as applied to derogations of the right to be free from arbitrary arrest or 
imprisonment. If, however, the arrest or imprisonment of individuals was not 
arbitrary (i.e., based on their suspected conduct in violation of established law 
rather than on their membership in a drug cartel), then the U.S. military would 
likely be acting in compliance with IHRL and not frustrating the object and 
purpose of the American Convention.  
C. Customary International Law 
In addition to the treaty law, there is a body of “customary international 
law” that would control U.S. military conduct in Mexico.121 Customary 
international law is created through the practice of states and opinio juris (state 
practices are implemented because states believe they are required by 
international law). A state may not be required to observe customary 
international law if the state has been a “persistent objector.”122 To qualify as a 
persistent objector, a state must have dissented from a practice as that practice 
ripened into customary international law.123 Once the practice subsequently 
matures into customary international law, any state that persistently objected to 
it is exempt from it.124  
  
 
 120 Id. (emphasis added). 
 121 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 
14, ¶ 178 (June 27). 
 122 Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in 
International Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 457, 458 (1985). 
 123 Id. (“A state that has persistently objected to a rule is not bound by it, so long as the objection was 
made manifest during the process of the rule’s emergence.”). 
 124 Id. 
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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is accepted,125 at 
least in relevant part, as articulating customary international law.126 Article 3 of 
the UDHR states simply, and without territorial limitations, “[e]veryone has 
the right to life, liberty and security of person.”127 It is well established that, as 
a corollary to this right, it is a violation of customary international human 
rights law for a state to carry out extrajudicial killings unless as a necessary act 
in exigent circumstances—for example, a police officer acting in self-defense 
of himself or others.128 Article 9 of the UDHR prohibits the arbitrary arrest or 
detention of any individual.129 Customary international human rights law has 
accordingly been interpreted as prohibiting detention of individuals in a 
manner “incompatible with the principles of justice or with the dignity of the 
human person.”130  
The U.S. opposition to extraterritorial application of the ICCPR could be 
argued to make the United States a persistent objector to the extraterritorial 
application of the ICCPR’s obligations that can also be traced to customary 
international human rights law. Assuming arguendo that the U.S. objection to 
extraterritorial application of treaty-based human rights law is relevant for 
purposes of becoming a persistent objector to customary international human 
rights law, the argument still fails because the United States has not been 
persistent in its objections. In 1980, the United States filed a brief, as amicus 
curiae, in the matter of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala before the Second Circuit, 
arguing that “certain fundamental human rights are now guaranteed to 
individuals as a matter of customary international law.”131 In 1980, the United 
States also filed a written proceeding in the Case Concerning United States 
Diplomatic & Consular Staff in Tehran before the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) arguing that states must “respect and observe” the rights 
enumerated in the UDHR and “corresponding portions of the [ICCPR]” for 
“nationals and aliens alike.”132 In the same brief, the United States specifically 
 
 125 Digital Record of the UDHR, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS. (Feb. 2009), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NEWSEVENTS/Pages/DigitalrecordoftheUDHR.aspx (explaining that the UDHR 
has “become the international standard of human rights.”). 
 126 Richard Lillich, The Growing Importance of Customary International Human Rights Law, 25 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 2 (1995).  
 127 UDHR, supra note 43, art. 3. 
 128 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 129 UDHR, supra note 43, art. 9. 
 130 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 131 Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 6, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d 
Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090). 
 132 Memorial of the Government of the United States of America, Case Concerning U.S. Diplomatic & 
Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1982 I.C.J. Pleadings 121, 182 (Jan. 12, 1980). 
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identified Articles 3 and 9 of the UDHR as deserving such treatment by 
states.133 Additionally, between 1980 and 1993, three separate U.S. federal 
courts found the UDHR to be “an authoritative statement of customary 
international law.”134  
Furthermore, the first time the United States made any objection to 
extraterritorial treaty-based application of human rights law was in 1995.135 
The 2010 Office of Legal Adviser’s memo, discussed above in Part III(A), 
illustrates that the United States did not object to extraterritorial application of 
the ICCPR “(1) at the time of signature and transmittal of the Covenant in 
1978; (2) upon Senate advice and consent to the Covenant in 1991, or (3) at the 
time [sic] ratification in 1992.”136 In 1994, having occasion to do so, the 
United States again failed to make a territorial objection in its report to the 
HRC concerning the applicability of the ICCPR.137 The United States, having 
come late to its position on the matter, cannot now avail itself of “persistent 
objector” status to the existence of customary international law that it accepted 
as early as 1980.  
IV. PRESIDENT’S DUTY TO OBEY IHRL 
The U.S. Constitution requires the President to “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.”138 The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution makes 
treaties the supreme law of the land.139 The President therefore has a 
constitutional duty to direct the military in a manner that conforms to treaty-
based human rights law.140 The President is additionally bound by customary 
international human rights in two respects. Part IV(A) discusses the President’s 
obligation to faithfully execute customary international human rights law 
generally. Part IV(B) discusses the U.S. Constitution’s structural bounds, or 
lack thereof, on the President’s authority to order the military to act against 
Mexican drug cartels in a manner that violates customary international human 
rights law. 
 
 133 Id. n. 36. 
 134 Phaidin v. U.S, 28 Fed. Cl. 231, 234 (Fed. Cl. 1993); see also Siderman de Blake v. Republic of 
Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 719 (9th Cir. 1992); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 135 DEP’T OF STATE LEGAL ADVISER, supra note 109, at 30. 
 136 Id. at 25. 
 137 Id. at 29. 
 138 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 139 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 140 But see Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 508 (2008) (holding Article 94 of the U.N. Charter was not 
self-executing and thus not judicially enforceable by Article III courts whereas the present issue concerns the 
duty to faithfully execute under Article II).  
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A. Duty to Faithfully Execute Customary International Human Rights Law 
Applications of the U.S. Constitution’s Take Care Clause requirements to 
customary international human rights law are nuanced. The “law” the Take 
Care Clause charges the President with faithfully executing is left unqualified 
by the Clause’s text. Elsewhere, however, the U.S. Constitution’s text twice 
qualifies its use of the word “law.” Article I recognizes both the “Law of the 
Nations” (customary international law) and “the Laws of the Union.”141 Thus, 
a plain reading of the U.S. Constitution requires the President to faithfully 
execute all law, including customary international law, because the Take Care 
Clause’s textual use of “law” is left general, whereas elsewhere the 
constitutional text qualifies the general with the specific.  
The Take Care Clause’s drafting history supports this conclusion. An early 
draft of the Clause included a qualifier that care be taken only with respect to 
“national laws.”142 Subsequent draft language qualified the Take Care Clause 
as only applicable to “the laws of the United States.”143 This qualifier was 
subsequently deleted and the final adopted version simply read “take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed.”144  
The courts have also concluded that customary international law is part of 
U.S. domestic law. In 1900, the U.S. Supreme Court held in The Paquete 
Habana that customary international law is U.S. law where “there is no treaty 
and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision.”145 This 
holding confirms customary international law is part of U.S. federal common 
law but also suggests the President or Congress can violate it through some 
other exercise of power.146 Customary international law as a part of U.S. 
domestic law is therefore a “gap” filler to be applied when no other controlling 
law exists.147 It would appear, then, that customary international law is part of 
Article II’s Take Care Clause but not part of Article VI’s Supremacy Clause.148  
 
 141 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 142 1 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 63 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911). 
 143 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 185 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911). 
 144 Id. at 660. 
 145 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
 146 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 
F.2d 876, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1980) (explaining that customary international law is a surviving vestige of federal 
common law following Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). 
 147 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 148 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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It follows that the President, otherwise bound to faithfully execute 
customary international law by operation of the Supremacy Clause, must have 
a countervailing constitutional authority for taking executive action to displace 
customary international law. Three circuit courts have generally adopted this 
conclusion.149 The U.S. Supreme Court, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, suggested that the President’s constitutional authority as chief 
executive of foreign affairs could supersede any duty to faithfully execute 
customary international law.150 Sabbatino explains that the chief executive 
authority vests the President with a responsibility not only to simply interpret 
customary international law, but also to advocate for changes in customary 
international law when he believes it is necessary to do so.151 The argument 
would follow that the advocacy role permits the President to take unilateral 
action (i.e., without congressional approval) that violates customary 
international law as part of a bid to create or change customary international 
law to benefit the nation.  
The argument is misapplied in this instance because the rights to life and to 
be free from prolonged arbitrary detention are each considered jus cogens.152 
The norms of jus cogens are “accepted and recognized by the international 
community as a norm from which no derogation is permitted.”153 Thus, the 
rights to life and to be free from arbitrary detention are not malleable 
customary international human rights laws. It is therefore beyond the 
President’s unilateral authority, assuming arguendo it exists at all, to violate 
these norms under the pretense of shaping customary international law. 
B. Constitutional Structural Limits on Presidential Power 
The U.S. Constitution places structural constraints on the exercise of 
presidential authority. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice 
Jackson issued an influential concurring opinion to assess presidential power 
through a tri-partite analysis, which divides presidential power into three 
categories based on what Congress has or has not done.154 Category one 
includes presidential acts taken pursuant to an expressed or implied 
 
 149 See, e.g., Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1451 (9th Cir. 1995); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 
F.2d 1446, 1454–55 (11th Cir. 1986); Gisbert v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1448 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 150 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 432–33. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Jus cogens are principles that form the norms of international law that cannot be set aside. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 153 Jus Cogens, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 154 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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authorization of Congress. When acting in this category, the President has 
maximum authority.155 Category two presidential actions are done in the 
absence Congress’s approval or denial. This is a “gray” area of presidential 
authority.156 Category three are presidential actions incompatible with the 
expressed or implied will of Congress.157 This is the lowest presidential 
authority and, to be constitutional, it must be only “his own constitutional 
powers minus any specific constitutional powers of Congress over the 
matter.”158  
While it is true that “the source of the President’s power to act in foreign 
affairs does not enjoy any textual detail, the historical gloss on the ‘executive 
Power’ vested in Article II of the Constitution has recognized the President’s 
‘vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations.’”159 
Nonetheless, unilaterally ordering the U.S. military to Mexico to address the 
drug cartels would encroach upon the exclusive Article I congressional 
authority to regulate foreign commerce,160 as well as the following shared 
constitutional powers: the war powers;161 the power to send ambassadors;162 
and the treaty-making power.163 Therefore, without congressional 
acquiescence, the President cannot send the military to Mexico without 
violating customary international human rights law.164 
In foremost support of this conclusion is Congress’s expansive authority to 
regulate foreign commerce.165 The Eleventh Circuit found this authority 
includes “at least the power to regulate the . . . ‘instrumentalities’ of commerce 
between the United States and other countries.”166 The President’s use of the 
military as the instrument to stop the Mexican drug trade from crossing the 
U.S. border would encroach on Congress’s exclusive and expansive commerce 
 
 155 Id. at 635–37. 
 156 Id. at 637. 
 157 Id. at 637–38. 
 158 Id. at 637. 
 159 American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)) (emphasis added). 
 160 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587. 
 161 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11–13 (granting Congress the power to declare war and “make Rules 
concerning Captures,” “to raise . . . Armies,” and to “maintain a Navy . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (naming 
the President the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces). 
 162 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the President the power to appoint Ambassadors with the 
advice and consent of the Senate).  
 163 Id. (granting the President the power to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate).  
 164 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981). 
 165 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see U.S. v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 166 U.S. v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651, 668 (11th Cir. 2016). 
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clause power. If done through unilateral presidential action, it would be an 
unconstitutional exercise of power. 
Consider also the “war powers.” Article II, § 2 makes the President 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Article I, § 8, Clause 11 of the U.S. 
Constitution gives Congress the power to “declare War” and “make Rules 
concerning Captures on Land and Water.”167 This clause vests Congress with 
the authority to initiate armed conflict and to define what property may be 
subsequently taken by the military.168 It operates as a direct congressional limit 
on the “Commander-in-Chief” authority.169 Congress enacted the War Powers 
Act over presidential veto to clarify how these shared authorities over the 
military should operate.170 The Act requires the President to report to Congress 
any introduction of U.S. armed forces, inter alia, anytime he introduces 
substantially large numbers of the Armed Forces into a foreign country, if 
those armed forces are “equipped for combat.”171 The scope, scale, and violent 
nature of the drug cartels’ operations—and President Trump’s rhetoric—signal 
that this requirement would also be satisfied. The Act further requires, without 
regard to the quantity of troops introduced, reporting to Congress in any case 
where armed forces are introduced “into situations where imminent 
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.”172 This 
provision would be triggered if the President introduced armed drones into 
Mexico because the armament carried by such drones would be prima facie 
evidence of their imminent involvement in hostilities. After receiving a report 
from the President, Congress may exercise a supervisory function over that 
deployment and, by a concurrent resolution, order the removal of those armed 
forces.173 There is some, albeit limited, “historical gloss” suggesting the War 
Powers Act requires congressional oversight of presidential orders deploying 
the military to a foreign state for the purpose of restoring law and order. On 
“February 25, 2000, President Clinton reported to Congress ‘consistent with 
the War Powers Resolution’ that he had authorized the participation of a small 
number of U.S. military personnel” to assist in maintaining “law and order” in 
East Timor.174 On March 2, 2001, President George W. Bush continued the 
 
 167 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 168 Ingrid Wuerth, The Captures Clause, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683, 1740 (2009). 
 169 Id. at 1743. 
 170 50 U.S.C.S. § 1541 (1973). 
 171 50 U.S.C.S. § 1543 (1973). 
 172 Id. 
 173 50 U.S.C.S. § 1544 (1973). 
 174 BARBARA SALAZAR TORREON, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., R42738, INSTANCES OF USE OF UNITED 
STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798-2016 (2016). 
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precedent and reported to Congress his continued commitment of U.S. military 
to support law and order in East Timor.175  
Next, consider the shared power over appointing and sending 
ambassadors.176 The U.S. Constitution requires the Senate to provide its advice 
and consent for the appointment of ambassadors.177 Ambassadors are the head 
of a diplomatic mission to another state.178 A diplomatic mission is understood 
to be, inter alia, the representation of the sending state’s interests and the 
promotion of friendly relations between the receiving state and the sending 
state.179 Therefore, the Senate has a shared power with the President over the 
way the United States conducts relations with Mexico, which would 
necessarily include whether the United States violates the human rights of 
Mexicans.  
Finally, Congress has not been silent in its views concerning the U.S. 
military’s observance of human rights; therefore, the prospect of presidential 
action to send the military unconstrained by customary international human 
rights law to Mexico would be a Youngstown category three exercise of power. 
In Congress’s declaration of policy concerning the use of the U.S. military in 
foreign assistance, codified in 22 U.S.C.S. §§ 2301–2305, Congress stated that 
the use of the military will be congruent with the United States’ “principal goal 
. . . to promote the increased observance of internationally recognized human 
rights . . . .”180 Congress has further stated: “It is the policy of the United States 
. . . to affirm fundamental freedoms and internationally recognized human 
rights in foreign countries, as reflected in the [UDHR] and the [ICCPR], and to 
condemn offenses against those freedoms and rights as a fundamental 
component of United States foreign policy . . . .”181 It is, accordingly, 
inescapable that Congress has articulated a position incompatible with ordering 
the U.S. military to Mexico without the constraints of customary international 
human rights law. Under Justice Jackson’s oft-cited Youngstown analysis, any 
executive action doing so would be unconstitutional.  
  
 
 175 Id. 
 176 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 177 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 178 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, arts. 1, 3, 14, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 
U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1972). 
 179 Diplomatic Mission, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 180 22 U.S.C.S. § 2304 (1961). 
 181 22 U.S.C.S. § 8202 (2007). 
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CONCLUSION 
President Trump has suggested both that the U.S. military should go fight 
Mexican drug cartels and that, but for controlling legal authorities, the U.S. 
military should in some circumstances kill civilians.182 The latter suggestion 
seems to lament the existence of IHL protections against military abuses. The 
situation in Mexico is not, however, an armed conflict. The drug cartels’ use of 
violence is for business purposes, designed to create chaos ripe for a criminal 
enterprise’s exploitation. There is no indication that the drug cartels seek to 
govern or control territory beyond what is necessary for their criminal 
purposes. Applying these facts to an analysis of the ICRC’s commentary and to 
the requirements of AP II—in addition to comparing them to the ICTY’s 
jurisprudence—results in a conclusion that the drug cartels’ violence does not 
trigger CA 3’s application of IHL.  
Perhaps, then, the President might be emboldened by the inapplicability of 
IHL to the drug cartel violence as he endeavors to confront them. Yet, as the 
commentary to AP II cautions, “this does not mean that there is no 
international legal protection applicable to such situations, as they are covered 
by universal and regional human rights instruments.”183 The ICCPR is one 
such instrument whose protections are rightly considered to apply to Mexicans 
against U.S. military actions. Even if the President rejects, as previous 
administrations have, the extraterritorial reach of the ICCPR, customary 
international law exists separately from treaty-based law and is also 
controlling. Thus, IHRL, whether operating through the ICCPR, the American 
Convention, customary international human rights law, or all three, binds the 
U.S. military’s actions while operating inside of Mexico. 
The President, and by extension the U.S. military, is obligated to adhere to 
these international legal authorities under U.S. domestic law. The President has 
a constitutional duty to faithfully execute the ICCPR. His obligation to 
faithfully execute the law also extends to customary international human rights 
law because, in this instance, there is no offsetting of constitutional authority 
relieving him of this duty. Unless Congress decides otherwise, the “bad 
hombres” of the Mexican drug cartels are entitled to certain legal human rights 
protections from the U.S. military. The President should welcome, rather than 
bemoan, this conclusion as a demonstration of fidelity to our nation’s founding 
 
 182 LoBianco, supra note 4; Wong, supra note 6. 
 183 Sandoz, supra note 53, at 1356. 
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principles and as support to a rules-based international order through which the 
United States might, over time, find greater security and prosperity.  
 
